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Digitizing the Private Search Doctrine: Is a
Computer a Container?
by TAYLOR J. PFINGST*
Introduction
The digital era has ushered in a new age, where the technology of
today is almost instantaneously surpassed by the ideas of tomorrow. As
America embraces this digital evolution, the law becomes paralyzed and
unable or unprepared to adapt to the new demands of digital devices. New
Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues-not previously
contemplated-continue to develop. This Note addresses the issue of the
circuit split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals over the scope of the Private
Search Doctrine as it applies to information stored or viewed in digital
media devices (e.g., cell phones, computers, hard drives, etc.). The Private
Search Doctrine allows the government to conduct a warrantless follow-up
search, on the heels of a private search, without violating the Fourth
Amendment. However, the circuits are split as to the constitutional limits
on government conduct for a follow-up search of digitally stored material
subsequent to an initial private search.
Here is a hypothetical to illuminate this issue: Private Citizen A
discovers a couple of documents on her Friend, B's, unlocked computer
that appear to be detailed plans for a future terrorist attack that include a
map of a federal court house and bomb instructions. Friend B did not give
permission to Private Citizen A to use her computer. Friend B's computer
has a storage capacity of two terabytes of data and contains an immense
amount of personal information including photographs, medical records,
tax forms, and journal entries. After discovering the documents, Private
Citizen A notifies the authorities and provides the government agents who
respond to the call with Friend B's computer. At this point, the circuits
diverge as to what the government agents may now search without a
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warrant. The circuits, however, are in agreement that, if the government
agents limit their examination to only the documents originally seen by the
private searcher, then there is no Fourth Amendment search or violation.
If, instead, the agents see things Private Citizen A had not viewed
previously-or they conduct a full search of the computer without
obtaining a warrant-the courts disagree as to whether a broader search
beyond what was seen by Private Citizen A violates the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The federal circuit courts' holdings run contrary to one another in how
they resolve these issues and disagree as to what constitutes a permissible
search under the Private Search Doctrine. For instance, the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits adopted the "closed container" approach where the
government may examine all of the contents of a "container," such as a
computer or other digital media device-subsequent to a private search-
including items that the private citizen did not see.2 The Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits, in contrast, hold that the government is limited by and
may only view things seen by the private citizen. Essentially, the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits restrict the authorities to conducting a duplicate search-
an examination identical to what the private searcher originally viewed.3
The issue is a question of degree: to what extent may government agents
look beyond the original documents or images seen by the private party on
an electronic device, and how should the courts define the permissible
scope of the Private Search Doctrine?
While some may argue that allowing the government to search
through one's computer without a warrant is justified in order to learn more
about a potential terrorist attack, the resulting standard creates a significant
expansion of the government's search and seizure abilities. This Note
argues that he Private Search Doctrine-as applied to electronic devices
and digital files-should be narrowly construed so that the government
may only conduct a duplicate search without a warrant, consistent with the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' holdings, and examine only those items
already seen by a private searcher. Absent some other exception, the
government should be required to obtain a warrant to go beyond the scope
of the initial search to protect individuals' Fourth Amendment privacy
rights.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001); Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d
832, 835 (7th Cir. 2012).
3. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir. 2015).
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In light of the Supreme Court's recent holding in Riley v. California
and the development of modem technology, this Note seeks to answer the
question of the correct interpretation and scope of the Private Search
Doctrine, as applied to electronic devices.4 Part I of this Note provides the
background of the Private Search Doctrine and explains the origins,
purpose, and applications of the doctrine. It discusses the expectation of
privacy in digital devices, the government agency test, and the rights of
private searchers. Part II describes the conflicting approaches-"closed
container" versus "duplicate search"-taken by the circuit courts that have
addressed the scope of a follow-up search under the Private Search
Doctrine and explains the subsequent doctrinal confusion. Part III argues
that the conflicting opinions should be resolved by narrowly limiting the
scope of a warrantless follow-up investigation, so that the government may
only conduct a duplicate search. Ultimately, the duplicate search approach
should be adopted, requiring the government to obtain a warrant to search
beyond the scope of the private search, because a narrower reading of the
Private Search Doctrine as it applies to electronic devices is consistent with
the sentiments expressed in Riley regarding the "privacies of life" that cell
phones and other electronic devices possess.
I. The Private Search Doctrine Defined in the Digital Age
This Part discusses the background, substance, and purpose of the
Private Search Doctrine as it relates to the Fourth Amendment search and
seizure requirements. It examines the origin of the Private Search Doctrine
in the Supreme Court cases Walter v. United States and United States v.
Jacobson, and inspects an individual's right to privacy in digital devices.s
Lastly, it clarifies who is classified as a private searcher, rather than a
government agent, and explains when the doctrine is applicable.
A. Individuals Have an Expectation of Privacy in Their Electronic
Devices
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures ..... 6  Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment search
exists where the government obtains evidence resulting from "physical
intruding on the persons, houses, papers, or effects."7 In Katz v. United
4. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
5. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (internal quotations omitted).
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States, Justice Harlan-in his concurrence-provided a two-prong test to
determine whether an individual has a Fourth Amendment right in items
searched.8 The test required that: (1) "a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy," and (2) "the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Based on the Katz test,
when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable, a Fourth Amendment violation exists.9
In 2013, the Court recognized that citizens "expect" that the contents
of their electronic devices are private and that this expectation is
objectively reasonable.10 Therefore, police examinations of electronic
devices are unreasonable, absent a warrant, and should be regulated to
ensure privacy rights remain intact in such effects." Although the law is
still adapting to address the new issues modem technology poses,
electronic devices are worthy of the same Fourth Amendment protections
afforded to one's home or other personal effects.1 2 A computer hard drive
is essentially "the digital equivalent of its owner's home, capable of
holding a universe of information."1 3 Accordingly, courts have held that
the owner of a computer has an expectation of privacy in its contents and
that this expectation is one that society deems objectively reasonable.14
Consistent with the privacy rights afforded to cell phones in Riley v.
California, guidelines must be set addressing the scope of the Private
Search Doctrine to prevent the government from utilizing it as a Fourth
Amendment loophole.
B. Origins of the Private Search Doctrine: Walter v. United States and
United States v. Jacobsen
Private intrusions or searches conducted by citizens not acting under
governmental authority are exempt from Fourth Amendment
requirements.'5 When a private searcher discovers evidence of a crime and
alerts government agents, they need not "stop [the private searcher] or avert
their eyes.,,16 The Private Search Doctrine says that when an individual
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
9. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
10. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 (2014).
11. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
12. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483.
13. United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kansas v.
Rupnick, 125 P.3d 541, 552 (Kan. 2005)).
14. See United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the defendant had a "objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer").
15. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
16. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489 (1971).
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shows contraband to another, or a private searcher gains access to such
information, and then shares it with the authorities, the government is not
precluded from examining such information.'7 But, the agents must limit
their investigation to those items previously seen by the private searcher to
protect constitutional privacy rights.'8
Under the Private Search Doctrine, private intrusions or searches
conducted by citizens not acting under governmental authority do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment.19 The Private Search Doctrine applies
when a private individual searches an item, finds potential contraband, and
notifies law enforcement.20 Following a private search, a government agent
may conduct a warrantless follow-up search that does not exceed the scope
of the initial search.21 Precedent indicates that the government may
replicate the private searcher's examination without it qualifying as a
search because the defendant no longer has an expectation of privacy in
those objects.2 2
1. Walter v. United States (1980): Creation of the Private Search Doctrine
The Private Search Doctrine originated in Supreme Court precedent
indicating that Fourth Amendment search and seizure restrictions only
apply to searches conducted by government agents, not private citizens.2 3
In 1980, the Court in Walter recognized the government's duty to
investigate potentially illegal evidence found during a private search and
set the stage for its ruling in United States v. Jacobsen.24 The Walter Court
held that strict limitations must be placed on an official search conducted
on the heels of a private one to comply with Fourth Amendment
protections.25 Any items not viewed by the private searcher should not be
open to a warrantless investigation by the government because the owner
still has an expectation of privacy in the remaining contents.26
17. Id. at 489.
18. Id.
19. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
20. Id. at 115.
21. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984); see Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 662 (1980).
22. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
23. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); Walter, 447 U.S. at 662.
24. Walter, 447 U.S. at 662.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 659.
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In Walter, packages containing obscene material (on film) were
shipped to the wrong address.27 The recipients opened the packages and
notified the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). 28  Although the
private searchers were unable to view the contents of the films, the boxes
that they arrived in had "suggestive drawings" and "explicit descriptions of
the contents."2 9 The FBI picked up the packages "without making any
effort to obtain a warrant" before viewing several reels of the film on a
projector, none of which had been seen by the private searchers.30 At issue
before the Court was whether the FBI agents were required to obtain a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment, or if they were permitted to view the
films without one.3' The Court decided that "[i]t was a search, there was
no warrant; the owner had not consented; and there were no exigent
circumstances."32 Therefore, the unauthorized viewing of the films was an
unconstitutional invasion of the owner's right to privacy.33
The scope of authorized searches must be clearly established and the
"government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it has
the right to make an independent search."3 4 In Walter, the viewing of the
films was akin to a separate search altogether because it went beyond what
the private searchers had seen.3 5 The Court clarified that even though the
FBI agents legally obtained the boxes, they were not authorized to search
their contents.6 In Walter, the Court analogized the situation to a scenario
in which officials obtain a warrant to search a garage-they may not search
the entire house.3 7 Similarly, if the government is searching for a stolen
refrigerator, the agents may not look through desk drawers.3 8 The Court
stressed that the agents conducted a new search when they projected and
viewed images not previously seen by the private searchers because the
owner of the package still had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their
contents.3 9 The Walter Court's narrow allowance of the follow-up search is
27. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980).
28. Id. at 652.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 651.
32. Id.
33. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980).
34. Id. at 657.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 654.
37. Id. at 657.
38. Id.
39. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 659 (1980).
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the approach that should be adopted in order to protect Fourth Amendment
privacy rights.
2. United States v. Jacobsen (1983) The Court Places Parameters on the
Scope of the Doctrine, the "Virtual Certainty" Test
The Court next addressed the scope of the private search doctrine in
United States v. Jacobsen-three years after Walter v. United States-and
provided a two-factor analysis to evaluate the scope of the doctrine.4 0 The
Court concluded that the degree of how much the government "stands to
gain when it re-examines the evidence and. . . how certain it is regarding
what it will find" determines whether the government impermissibly
exceeds the scope of the initial search.4' Under this test, the government
remains within the scope of a prior private search when: (1) an individual's
expectation of privacy in information uncovered was already frustrated,
and (2) the government was "virtually certain" that it would not discover
anything else of significance.42 Information found during a private search
may be classified as nonprivate once the private party finds or opens it,
thereby eliminating any expectation of privacy that may have existed.43 A
warrantless investigation, on the heels of a private search, must meet this
virtual certainty threshold to comply with the Private Search Doctrine.44
The Court distinguished between searches involving physical
"containers" and electronic devices. In the modem technological world,
what constitutes a "closed container" is unclear and difficult, if not
impossible, to define. In Jacobsen, after a package was damaged in transit,
Federal Express employees examined the contents pursuant to company
policy. 4 5 They observed bags of a white powdery substance within the
package and notified the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), suspecting
that the substance was contraband.4 6 When a DEA agent arrived at the
scene he reopened the package, opened the bags of white powder, and
tested a small amount in each to confirm that the substance was cocaine.4 7
The Court held that the agents did not infringe on any constitutional
privacy interests that had not already been frustrated by the private search
40. Id. at 119.
41. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 485-86 (6th Cir. 2015).
42. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 117.
45. Id. at 111.
46. Id..
47. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
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so their actions were permissible without a warrant.4 8 The government
agent acted within his purview in conducting an examination of the
contents of the package because the agents were "virtually certain" as to
what they would find and any expectation of privacy no longer existed after
the private search.49
The Court arrived at this decision by weighing the additional invasion
of privacy from inspecting the remaining contents of the package against
the degree to which the agent exceeded the scope of the private search.o
Because the agent was "virtually certain" that there was "nothing else of
significance" in the package beyond the identical bundles of white powder,
the Court held it was not a new search and the agent's manual inspection of
the contents could not "tell him anything more than he already had been
told" by the private searchers.5 ' Any privacy interests the owner of the
package previously had disappeared once it was unsealed and examined by
the private searchers.5 2 In addition, even the agent's on-site test of the
powdery substance was deemed reasonable because the government's
interest to confirm that the substance was cocaine outweighed the intrusion
53
of using a small amount of powder to test it. The Court held that a
government agent's confirmation of prior knowledge-namely the contents
of the container, according to the private searcher-did not exceed the
scope or require them to first obtain a warrant.54
The Court's analysis of physical storage containers with physical
contents, such as the bags of powder in Jacobsen, cannot be properly
applied to protect privacy rights in the digital realm. In the case of
Jacobsen, the officers could simply glance at the package to understand its
storage potential.55 While government agents may be virtually certain that
a few bags of white powder all contain cocaine, this logic is unworkable
when applied to a computer or cell phone-full of images, files, and
documents where one click could lead to infinite possibilities of locating
and viewing vast amounts of personal information. Once the package in
Jacobsen was opened and its contents revealed, the expectation of privacy
48. Id. at 126.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. at 115.
51. Id. at 119.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984).
54. Id. at 120.
55. Id.
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ceased to exist.56 The same cannot be said after a digital image or file is
viewed on an electronic device.
C. Government Agency Test: Was the Private Searcher Acting as a
Government Agent?
The Private Search Doctrine is based on the notion that the Fourth
Amendment restricts unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government against private citizens.57 The Fourth Amendment is only
intended to limit governmental action, so a search by a private individual
for private reasons does not implicate it.58 Even where the initial search by
the private party is an unreasonable invasion, it does not trigger Fourth
Amendment protections.59  However, the fact that the private party
searched something "that might have been impermissible for a government
agent" to view without a warrant does not preclude the government from
conducting a follow up examination.60  The government may inspect
potential contraband discovered by a private party.
The majority of circuit courts use some variation of the Sixth Circuit's
two-prong test to define when a private searcher qualifies as a government
agent which requires that: (1) the police must have instigated, encouraged,
or participated in the search; and (2) the private searcher must have
conducted the search with the intent of assisting the police in their
investigative efforts.6 1 The First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits echo the Sixth
Circuit's emphasis on government involvement in the search and the
searcher's personal intent.6 2 For the search to be considered government
action, the individual must have acted as an "'instrument' or agent of the
state."63 A person does not qualify as a government agent simply because
56. Id.
57. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
58. Id. at 476; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984); Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980); United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2015).
60. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114-15.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83 (6th. Cir. 1985).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that "the
extent of the government's role in instigating or participating in the search, its intent and the
degree of control it exercises over the search and the private party, and the extent to which the
private party aims primarily to help the government" are all relevant factors); United States v.
Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the two relevant factors of analysis are:
"(1) the government's knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent of the party performing the
search" to make a determination); United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the government must have purposefully encouraged the private action under a
totality of the circumstances analysis).
63. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
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there was some "antecedent contact" between the private searcher and the
police.64 Returning to the hypothetical at the beginning of this Note, we
assume that Private Citizen A was not acting as a government agent or on
behalf of the government when she used Friend B's computer and stumbled
upon the questionable documents.
II. The Circuits are Split When Applying the Private Search
Doctrine
Part II will discuss the pre-Riley application of the Private Search
Doctrine as applied to searches of physical spaces and objects; and it will
examine the circuit decisions and split in chronological order to
demonstrate the shift in how federal circuit courts apply the doctrine before
and after Riley, as technology and precedent have developed. It will
examine how the Fifth and Seventh Circuits expanded the Court's
reasoning in Walter and Jacobsen in an attempt to classify various
electronic devices as closed containers.6 5  Next, it will discuss the
significance of the Riley decision and explain its relevance in the shift
towards a narrower interpretation of the doctrine. Finally, it will examine
how the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits addressed the issue post-Riley,
determined that the container approach is unworkable, and that the
government may only duplicate a private search without a warrant.66
A. Closed Container Versus Duplicate Search Approach
There is disagreement among the circuit courts that have addressed the
issue of whether a private search totally eliminates the expectation of
privacy in digital items not examined by the private searcher, thus, enabling
the police to search without a warrant. This question becomes more
complicated when dealing with the search of an electronic device
containing vast amounts of data and personal information. The federal
circuit courts are split over whether electronic devices should be considered
traditional "containers" to define the scope of a follow-up search under the
Private Search Doctrine.67 There is currently an equal two-two circuit split
64. United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. See generally United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001); Rann v. Atchison,
689 F.3d 832, (7th Cir. 2012).
66. See generally United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2015).
67. See Runyan, 275 F.3d at 449 (holding that a CD is a "closed container," and the
government may search the remaining contents of the container once it is opened); see also Rann,
689 F.3d at 833 (following the Fifth Circuit's approach in Runyan that electronic devices should
be treated as containers); but see Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 480 (holding that due to the
significant privacy interests at stake in computers, the government may only view images seen by
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regarding how to apply the Private Search Doctrine to modem electronic
devices. The Eleventh Circuit recently handed down a ruling in United
States v. Sparks, which was consistent with the Sixth Circuit's holding in
United States v. Lichtenberger that a laptop cannot be treated as a closed
container and that only a duplicate search is permissible under the Private
Search Doctrine.68 Notably, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits' rulings came
after the Court's Riley v. California decision and are consistent with the
holding that electronic devices-such as cell phones-contain "privacies of
life" that must be protected.6 9 The Fifth and Seventh Circuit decisions, in
contrast, were pre-Riley. The Court has yet to clearly define the scope of
the Private Search Doctrine and denied the petition for certiorari of the
Eleventh Circuit case to address the split over the correct interpretation of
the doctrine.7 0  The narrower scope purported by the Sixth and, now
Eleventh Circuit, is the correct interpretation and should be adopted by the
Court to provide clear guidelines for government searches and proper
instructions for the circuit courts to address this kind of issue.
B. The Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit Follow the Closed Container
Approach
1. United States v. Runyan (5th Cir. 2001)
The Fifth Circuit held that no new "search" exists if an officer views
any item in the container previously opened by the private individual.7 '
Under this standard, police may examine the remaining contents of a
container, subsequent o a private search, including items that the original
searcher had not seen.72 In United States v. Runyan, the Fifth Circuit held
that computer disks ("CDs") containing child pornography were to be
considered closed containers.7 3 Each CD was treated as a separate closed
container to determine whether the police exceeded the scope of their
investigation by viewing their contents.74 The government officials were
the private searcher); Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1335 (affirming the Sixth Circuit's standard that the
government may only conduct a duplicate examination and cannot view objects not seen by the
private searcher).
68. Sparks, 806 F.3d at 1335; Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d at 483.
69. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
70. Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Private Search Doctrine for
Computers, WASH. POST (May 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir
acy/wp/2015/05/20/sixth-circuit-creates-circuit-split-on-private-search-doctrine-for-com
puters/?tid=a_inl.
71. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464 (5th Cir. 2001).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 458.
74. Id.
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only permitted to view the contents of each CD where the private searcher
viewed at least one of the images on it.7" The remaining unopened ones
were not subject to government intrusion.16
Defendant Runyan's soon-to-be-ex-wife conducted a private search
and discovered CDs, computer files, photographs, film, zip drives, and
boxes containing child pornography.7 7 She reported her findings to the
police after viewing some images on the CDs, although she was unable to
view the zip drives.7 8 The defendant argued that police violated the Fourth
Amendment when they viewed the contents of each item-including those
that the private searchers had not personally seen.79 The Fifth Circuit held
that the officers did not exceed the scope permitted by the Private Search
Doctrine when they observed additional images on the unopened CDs or
other closed containers.so
2. Rann v. Atchison (7th Cir. 2012)
The Seventh Circuit utilized the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the scope of
the Private Search Doctrine and applied its reasoning in Rann v. Atchison,
holding that a government agent may conduct a more detailed search of an
already opened container.si In Rann, the defendant argued that images and
evidence of child pornography used at his trial should have been
suppressed because the police exceeded the scope of the private search.8 2
He alleged that the police should have had a warrant to open and view the
contents on his digital media devices (CDs and zip drives) because there
was no evidence that the private searchers saw any of the images.8 3
Consistent with Runyan, the Seventh Circuit held that the police officers
could view the images following the private search.84 The government
agent was free to search any materials on the CD if the private searcher
viewed at least one file on it in his initial search.s Even if the police
conducted a more thorough search of the devices, it was a legal expansion
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 460.
80. Id. at 465.
81. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
82. Id. at 836.
83. Id. at 837.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 836 (citing United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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of the initial search.86 Although the Fifth Circuit analogized a CD in 2005
to a container-with the Seventh Circuit following suit in 2012-these
decisions were made prior to Riley. Even if a CD could be classified
under this analysis, the same cannot be said for modem electronic devices
that have the capacity to store significantly larger amounts of data than that
in a CD.
C. The Court Implies that Electronic Devices Should Not Be Treated as
Closed Containers in Riley v. California (2014)
The scope of the Private Search Doctrine must be narrowly construed
so as to only allow a duplicate search, which is consistent with the Court's
treatment of electronic devices in Riley v. California. In Riley, the Court
rejected the government's argument that data on a cell phone was
indistinguishable from searches of physical items.88 The Court analogized
the comparison of the two and stated "that is like saying a ride on
horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon."89
Computers and other digital devices should be afforded the same
protections the Riley Court recognized for the contents of cell phones in the
realm of the Private Search Doctrine. Modem electronic devices are
analogous to-and include-cell phones because they, too, have an
immense storage capacity and can also be classified as the equivalent of
many devices rolled into one, such as a camera, video player, library, and
photo album.90 The difference between the two scenarios-searching a cell
phone incident to arrest versus conducting a warrantless investigation of a
computer, or the like, subsequent to a private search-is that the police can
examine contents of an electronic device following a private search, so
long as they do not go beyond the scope of the initial search.9' Although
the Court has not explicitly defined how to apply the Private Search
Doctrine to electronic devices, Riley indicates that a more restrictive
approach to searches in electronic devices is preferred because of their
immense storage capacities.9 2
86. Id. at 838.
87. Rann v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).; Runyan, 275 F.3d at 460; see
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (addressing the significant privacy interests at
stake in modern electronic devices in 2014).
88. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2489.
91. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
92. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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In addition to the privacy rights afforded to data stored on computers,
the Court recently emphasized that the "fact that technology now allows an
individual to carry such [private] information in his hand does not make the
information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders
fought." 93 The Court cautioned that the legality of a search of cell phones
is based on "the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy,
and on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."94  Where modem electronic devices
contain the "privacies of life," the risk of intrusion into the contents is
colossal.5 Privacy rights in electronic devices must be fiercely protected
with strict guidelines for the government in searching these items without
first obtaining a warrant.9 6
In Riley, the Court unanimously held that the police could not, without
a warrant, search through the contents on a cell phone seized from a
defendant incident to arrest.9 7 The Court reasoned that any search of a cell
phone-beyond ensuring that it was not a weapon-required a warrant
because no harm could be done to the arresting officer otherwise.98 The
nature of cell phones is distinct from other physical objects or containers
because of the large amount of personal information they can contain.99
Therefore, the privacy interests at risk versus the "negligible threat" posed
to law enforcement supports protecting this type of data from warrantless
intrusion.00
D. The Sixth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit Hold that the Duplicate
Search Approach Is Correct Post-Riley
1. United States v. Lichtenberger (6th Cir. 2015)
In contrast to the Fifth and Seventh Circuit rulings on the scope of the
Private Search Doctrine, the Sixth Circuit adopted a more workable
standard, requiring that evidence be suppressed when police search beyond
the scope of the private search.o'0  In Lichtenberger, the defendant's
93. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014).
94. Id. at 2484 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
95. Id. at 2495.
96. Id. at 2489.
97. Id. at 2480.
98. Id.; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (establishing the rule that "it is
reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons"
which may later threaten the safety of the officer or be used to escape).
99. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
100. Id. at 2482.
101. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015).
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girlfriend found images of child pornography and called the police.10 2
When an officer arrived, he asked her to show him the images she had
found.03 The defendant's girlfriend began clicking on random thumbnails
of images depicting child pornography, but was unsure if they were the
same ones she had viewed previously.'0 4
The Sixth Circuit suppressed the evidence and concluded that "there
are significant privacy interests at stake in searches of a laptop" and the
officer was too uncertain as to what he would find when the defendant's
girlfriend showed him the images.'05 Therefore, the court reasoned that the
privacy interests of the laptop were too extensive.1 06 However, the court
stated that government searches are permissible "in instances involving
physical containers and spaces," where the officers are virtually certain of
the contents and are unlikely to find additional contraband.107 Under the
Walter standard, the intrusion of the individual's privacy in Lichtenberger
outweighed the governmental interests when the officer seized the
defendant's computer that contained a wealth of unknown information on
i.108it.io
2. United States v. Sparks (11th Cir. 2015)
The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the scope of the Private
Search Doctrine, as it pertains to viewing images and videos on a cell
phone in United States v. Sparks. Ultimately, a video not previously
viewed by the private searcher was not subject to a warrantless search by
law enforcement under the Private Search Doctrine.109 In that case, after a
store employee discovered a lost cell phone and viewed some of its
contents, she found images that appeared to be child pornography."10 She
later showed her fianc6 who turned the phone in to the police."' When the
fianc6 arrived at the police station, he showed an officer some of the
images and scrolled through the entire album.112




106. Id. at 485.
107. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 486 (6th Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 479.
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The Eleventh Circuit found that there was no clear error with the
district court's conclusion that he private searcher previously observed all
of the images within the photo album." 3 Because the private searcher had
already viewed the photo album in its entirety it "insulated law
enforcement's later, more thorough review of [the images] from
transgressing the Fourth Amendment."1l 4 The court held that although the
officer was free to view all of the images within the specified photo album,
he was not permitted to view one of the videos, which was not previously
seen by the private searcher, without first obtaining a warrant." 5 Since the
officer's viewing of the second video on the cell phone exceeded, instead
of duplicated, the private searcher's initial examination, it was outside the
boundaries permitted under the Private Search Doctrine."16
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that disallowing law enforcement to
view the second video was consistent with the Court's reasoning in
Riley.117 The private searcher's examination of the cell phone may have
eliminated an expectation of privacy in the contents he viewed, but "it did
not expose every part of the information contained in the cell phone.""1 s So
the warrantless examination of the second video constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment because no search warrant was obtained."19
Although the court specified that the officer should not have viewed the
second video, it ultimately had no effect on the state court's valid issuance
of two warrants to search the cell phone and the defendant's house.120
III. How to Resolve the Doctrinal Confusion
After examining the conflicting approaches adopted by the circuit
courts, Part III discusses the proper interpretation f the doctrine with
reference to the hypothetical posed at the beginning, and the impact it may
have on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and privacy rights. It then
argues that the approach taken by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, post-
Riley, is correct so that the government is restricted to only conducting a
duplicate search. It explains why the container approach adopted by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits leads to an unworkable standard in the realm of
modem technology. Lastly, it addresses the counter arguments against
113. Id.
114. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (llth Cir. 2015).
115. Id. at 1335.
116. Id. at 1336.
117. Id. at 1335.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1335 (1lth Cir. 2015).
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adopting a narrow interpretation of the Private Search Doctrine and
ultimately rebuts them by explaining how Fourth Amendment privacy
rights outweigh any purported benefits to the container approach.
A. Private Search Doctrine Today: Returning to the Hypothetical
The scope of the Private Search Doctrine is inevitably intertwined
with the role the Fourth Amendment plays in the modem technological
world. Determining whether electronic devices-with their immense
storage capacities-can be accurately classified as physical containers is
relevant in developing modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Courts
must set guidelines regarding the scope for how far the government may
search in the realm of modem day technology. These limits would prevent
the government from traipsing through private information unrelated to an
initial search, which could potentially uncover criminal activity.
Current events and case law suggest that strict guidelines must be
established to preserve Fourth Amendment privacy rights in the digital age.
Returning to the hypothetical proposed in this Note's Introduction, one key
question to consider is whether the only suspicious items on the
individual's computer were those two documents. Assume that the
documents that Private Citizen A mistook for a new terrorist attack plan
were research conducted by Friend B for a presentation in an international
law class. Assume, too, that the next documents that would have popped
up in the file were Friend B's medical history and birth certificate. If the
Private Search Doctrine allows the government to search items the private
searcher did not view, all of this intimately private information would be
subject to a warrantless investigation by the government. Requiring the
government to obtain a warrant to investigate beyond conducting a
duplicate search creates a bright line rule for which officers need to adhere.
The narrower reading of the Private Search Doctrine-effectuated by the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits-requires agents to engage in common police
practices they already follow and would not impose an undue burden.
Even if the documents appeared to be a real terrorist plan, rather than class
research, the agents would surely have had probable cause after viewing
the documents to obtain a warrant and search the remaining contents of the
computer to confirm or deny their suspicions. At that point, the agents
could have also confiscated the computer to ensure its safety and to prevent
the destruction of evidence before obtaining a warrant to search it.
The right to privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion is the
keystone of the Fourth Amendment. The reasonableness of a search turns
on whether the police seeking evidence of criminal wrongdoing first
Spring 2017] 387
obtained a judicial warrant.12 1  If not, some exception to the warrant
requirement must be present to determine an-otherwise unreasonable-
search reasonable.122 Limiting the scope of the Private Search Doctrine to
allowing only a duplicate search, without a warrant, is the best course of
action. The closed container logic cannot, and should not, be transferred to
electronic devices or their contents. Where one image is seen on a screen
at a time or even where additional thumbnails or documents may be visible
at once, they hardly indicate the remainder of the contents of the device so
that an agent would be virtually certain as to what he could uncover.
B. The Duplicate Search Approach Should Be Adopted
The government should be required to limit its follow-up
investigations without a warrant-consistent with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and warrant exceptions. The Riley Court acknowledged that
even in scenarios where an individual has diminished privacy rights, such
as when he or she is lawfully arrested, it does not dispense with his or her
Fourth Amendment rights altogether.12 3 The Fourth Amendment applies
when the government searches items or uses information where an
individual still has an expectation of privacy.12 4 Certainly then, Friend B in
the hypothetical, whose documents and/or computer may be subject to
investigation, should retain her privacy rights in the remainder of the items
stored within the device. The Riley Court established that beyond disabling
a device, an officer should not look through the digital contents of the
device-even after an arrest.125 Therefore, when a private party notifies the
government about something suspicious, the Fourth Amendment protects
the individual's private information until a warrant is issued. Such
information should remain classified and maintain an expectation of
privacy, unless the private searcher's viewing or examination of the digital
file was consistent with the Court's analysis in Walter.12 6 The mere fact
that a private searcher saw one item should not eliminate an individual's
privacy rights in the other items that exist on a computer or other electronic
device.
121. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
122. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
123. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
124. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
125. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
126. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 649 (1980) (holding that the defendant
maintained an expectation of privacy in the contents of film strips because the private searchers
were unable to view them).
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C. Electronic Devices Should Not Be Treated as Containers
The possible intrusion on privacy is not physically limited when it
comes to cell phones or electronic devices, because they can store up to
"millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos." 2 7
Electronic data is both qualitatively and quantitatively distinguishable from
physical items and "treating a cell phone as a container whose contents
may be searched incident to arrest is a bit strained as an initial matter." 2 8
The closed container approach cannot be logically applied to electronic
devices, such as a computer, because of the inherent differences between
those devices and objects like a suitcase in Jacobsen or even a CD in
Runyan.
As an initial matter, the analogy does not work with electronic devices
because electronic devices, such as cell phones and computers, can be used
to access data elsewhere and are not confined to the contents within their
physical device.'2 9 The majority of computers and cell phones today have
"cloud" computing and access to data stored within various external
databases or servers.'30 Additionally, the potential for discovering private
information or data unrelated to any search or investigation is incredibly
high, given the sheer number of items on electronic devices. The Court has
held that "the sum of an individual's life can be reconstructed" through
contents on electronic devices.'31 It is true that, today, a search of a cell
phone would likely expose more information than a full search of a
house.132
Proponents of the container approach may argue that there is no
dispute that Friend B in the hypothetical had an initial expectation of
privacy in the contents of her computer. Further, proponents may believe
that Private Citizen A frustrated Friend B's expectation of privacy when
she discovered the documents. Therefore, the government would be
"properly limited in scope" if they only looked at the contents of one
container: the computer.'3 3  The container approach is based on the
argument that the legality of a search depends on "the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy, and on the degree to which it is
127. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
128. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981) (describing a "container" as "any object capable of holding another object")).
129. Id. at 2491.
130. Id. (defining "cloud computing" as "the capacity of internet-connected devices to
display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself").
131. Id.at2489.
132. Id. at 2491.
133. Id. at 2491.
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needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests" to ensure
there is a legal balance between these interests.13 4 However, the balance
between these interests vanishes under the container approach when the
government is permitted to comb through limitless information-no matter
what cost.135
D. Physical Computer vs. Digital File Folder: Neither Is a Container
Under the container approach, it could be argued that even if the idea
is dismissed in the context of the physical device (the computer), perhaps it
could be applied to the digital container, such as a digital folder. Although
no case law currently supports this standard, its presumption is that it
would create a balance between the physical world versus the digital world
arguments and allow for the containers, referred to in earlier case law, to be
applied in the modem day. However, this theory would fall short as well
because of the unworkability of such a standard given the nature of modem
technology. Nowadays, it is common for digital folders to be linked and
accessible from various locations. For instance, if a suspicious document
was found within a folder on an employee's computer while using a virtual
private network ("VPN") or remote work access, a broad interpretation of
the Private Search Doctrine could open up the entire company server to a
government investigation. Or suppose the document was in a sub-folder of
a larger folder-which one would be classified as the container: the file, the
sub-folder, or the entire desktop? The endless potential for the government
to search under the container approach with the Private Search Doctrine
fails to create any boundaries for government agents or rule for the courts
to apply. Therefore, treating electronic devices as "containers" is an
unworkable standard, regardless of whether it is applied to the physical or
digital aspect of a device.
Conclusion
The question presented by this Note is: What happens when a private
searcher finds potential contraband on an electronic device and reports it to
the authorities? The answer is: a government agent conducting a follow-up
investigation who responds to this type of call should only conduct a
duplicate search in order to examine what the private searcher saw, and
determine if any contraband or indication of illegal activity is present. The
agent should not be allowed to search the entire device because the owner
maintains an expectation of privacy in the remaining contents. Society
134. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
135. See United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 479 (6th Cir. 2015).
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must not accept the notion that the discovery of one potentially
incriminating image, document, or file is enough to allow the government
to conduct a warrantless search of that entire device and any other devices
to which it may be connected. It is illogical to create a standard in the
wake of Riley that one illegal document could potentially open up an entire
company's server to the government's prying eyes without a warrant. If
the seemingly boundless digital world is unfastened in this manner, the
heart of the Fourth Amendment will cease to exist in the realm of electronic
devices under the Private Search Doctrine.
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